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CHAPTER 18 
Mabo Misinterpreted: The unfortunate legacy of 
legislative distortion of Justice Brennan's judgment 
Kent McNeil 
The High Court's bold decision in Mabo v Queensland [No 2] 
undoubtedly changed the legal landscape in Australia in very positive 
ways.1 For the first time, Australian common law acknowledged 
that the Indigenous peoples have land rights based on occupation 
of land in accordance with their traditional laws and customs. The 
Court denounced the racial discrimination inherent in past denial 
of these rights and outlined legal doctrines that could be used to 
resolve Indigenous land claims in present-day Australia. This led to 
the enactment of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (NTA), by which the 
Commonwealth Parliament created a complex statutory regime for 
acknowledging and giving effect to native title. In doing so, however, I 
think 1 arliament seriously misinterpreted Justice Brennan's judgment 
in Mabo, thereby limiting the scope of native title, facilitating its loss, 
and practically eliminating the potential for inherent Indigenous 
governmental authority over native title lands. While many aspects of 
the decision could be discussed, in this chapter I want to focus on this 
misreading of Mabo and the serious consequences that have resulted. 
1 he misinterpretation arises from a passage in Brennan J's 
judgment that I think was taken out of context and imported into the 
definition of native title in the NTA. In Mabo, Brennan J stated: 
Native title has its origin in and is given its content by the 
traditional laws acknowledged by and the traditional customs 
observed by the indigenous inhabitants of a territory. The 
nature and incidents of native title must be ascertained as a 
matter of fact by reference to those laws and customs.2 
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Reproducing the substance of that language, s 223(1) of the NTA 
defines native title for common law purposes as follows: 
(1) The expression native title or native title rights and interests 
means the communal, group or individual rights and interests 
of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders in relation to 
land or waters, where: 
(a) the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional 
laws acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed, 
by the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders; and 
(b) the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those 
laws and customs, have a connection with the land or 
waters; and 
(c) the rights and interests are recognised by the common law 
of Australia. 
In subsequent decisions such as Commonwealth v Yarmirr;3 Western 
Australia v Ward,1 and Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community 
v Victoria,' the High Court has interpreted and applied s 223(1) so 
as to require native title claimants to prove that they had traditional 
laws and customs in relation to land at the time of Crown acquisition 
of sovereignty and that they have maintained a connection with the 
land under those laws and customs up to the time of the claim. If they 
are successful in doing so, the nature and incidents of their native 
title rights and interests are determined by those laws and customs, as 
Brennan J said they must be in the passage quoted above. This means, 
for example, that claimants who did not have laws and customs 
governing access to and use of certain resources, such as minerals, 
are not entitled to native title rights in relation to those resources.6 
As a result, the content of native title in Australia is generally much 
more limited than Aboriginal title in other common law jurisdictions, 
such as Canada where it amounts to 'the right to exclusive use and 
occupation of the land held pursuant to that title for a variety of 
purposes, which need not be aspects of those aboriginal practices, 
customs and traditions which are integral to distinctive aboriginal 
cultures', provided that the uses are not 'irreconcilable with the nature 
of the group's attachment to that land'.7 Moreover, since native title 
depends on the maintenance of traditional laws and customs, loss of 
those laws and customs results in loss of native title.8 
The problem with s 223(1), as interpreted and applied by the High 
Court, is that it fails to take other more nuanced parts of Brennan J's 
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judgment into account and ignores the order made by the Court in 
Mabo:' Looking first at the order, the Court declared that, with the 
exception of the Islands of Dauer and Waier and certain appropriated 
lands, 'the Meriam people are entitled as against the whole world to 
possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the lands of the Murray 
Islands'.10 As Brennan J pointed out, this was a declaration of 'the 
native communal title of the Meriam people'.11 However, Brennan 
J also observed that Justice Moynihan, who had made the factual 
findings on which the High Court's decision was based, had 'found 
that there was apparently no concept of public or general community 
ownership among the people of Murray Island, all the land of Murray 
Island being regarded as belonging to individuals or groups"2. But if 
all the land belonged to individuals or groups, on what facts did the 
High Court base its order declaring the communal title of the Meriam 
people as a whole? Despite Brennan J's statement that the content 
of native title is based on traditional laws and customs, by his own 
admission Meriam laws and customs did not contain a concept of 
communal title. Consequently, the communal title declared by the 
Court could not have been 'ascertained as a matter of fact by reference 
to those laws and customs'.13 It must have arisen from some other 
source. 
Although Brennan J did not provide a clear exposition of the source 
of the communal title of the Meriam people, I think the following 
passage reveals his understanding of this matter and explains the 
order of the Court: 
If it be necessary to categorize an interest in land as proprietary 
in order that it survive a change in sovereignty, the interest 
possessed by a community that is in exclusive possession of 
land falls into that category. Whether or not land is owned 
by individual members of a community, a community which 
asserts and asserts effectively that none but its members has 
any right to occupy or use the land has an interest in the land 
that must be proprietary in nature: there is no other proprietor.14 
In other words, a community such as the Meriam people that is in 
exclusive possession of land and effectively asserts that its members 
have the sole right to occupy and use the land has a communal 
title that is proprietary in nature. Brennan J then went on to clarify 
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the relationship between the communal title of the people and the 
individual rights of members: 
Where a proprietary title capable of recognition by 
the common law is found to have been possessed by 
a community in occupation of a territory, there is no 
reason why that title should not be recognized as a burden on 
the Crown's radical title when the Crown acquires sovereignty 
over that territory. The fact that individual members of the 
community ... enjoy only usufructuary rights that are not 
proprietary in nature is no impediment to the recognition of a 
proprietary community title. Indeed, it is not possible to admit 
traditional usufructuary rights without admitting a traditional 
proprietary community title ... [Tjhere is no impediment to the 
recognition of individual non-proprietary rights that are derived 
from the community's laws and customs and are dependent on 
the community title. A fortiori, there can be no impediment to 
the recognition of individual proprietary rights.15 
It is therefore apparent that Indigenous land rights can be layered, 
as Moynihan J and the High Court found the Meriam people's rights 
to be. A community in possession of a territory necessarily has a 
communal title, regardless of whether their traditional laws and 
customs contain such a concept — this was the title that was declared 
to exist in the Court order in Mabo.16 Moreover, this title amounts to 
a right 'as against the whole world to possession, occupation, use and 
enjoyment of the lands'17 because, as Brennan J stated, the 'ownership 
of land within a territory in the exclusive occupation of a people must 
be vested in that people: land is susceptible of ownership, and there are 
no other owners'.18 In the passage quoted above, Brennan J also made 
clear that the fact that the traditional laws and customs may provide 
only for lesser proprietary or usufructuary rights does not negate the 
all-inclusive title of the community. So when he stated later in his 
judgment that '[njative title has its origin in and is given its content 
by the traditional laws acknowledged by and the traditional customs 
observed by the indigenous inhabitants of a territory,' he cannot 
have meant to include the communal title derived from a people s 
exclusive occupation of its territory. Instead, he must have had in 
mind the individual and group rights referred to by Moynihan J that 
were based on traditional laws and customs. Thus, in the case ol the 
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Murray Islands, there are at least two layers of Indigenous land rights: 
the individual and group rights of members that are determined by 
reference to Meriam laws and customs, and the community's all-
inclusive rights against the whole world that arise, not from Meriam 
laws and customs, but from exclusive occupation of the islands by the 
entire community. 
Unfortunately, the drafters of s 223(1) of the NTA seem to have 
disregarded the Court order in Mabo entirely and taken no account 
of the passages in Brennan J's judgment that refer to the proprietary 
title of Indigenous communities that is derived from their exclusive 
occupation of land. As a result, in interpreting and applying the NTA 
in cases such as Ward,'20 the High Court has limited native title to 
rights that existed under traditional laws and customs at the time of 
Crown acquisition of sovereignty. Although one of the express objects 
of the NTA in s 3(a) is 'to provide for the recognition and protection 
of native title,' the title that is recognised and protected is the title as 
defined in s 223(1), not the kind of communal title that was declared 
by the High Court to exist on the Murray Islands. 
I he restrictive definition of native title in s 223(1) gives rise to 
this question: Did the enactment of the NTA foreclose the possibility 
of future declarations of all-inclusive communal title based on 
exclusive occupation, as declared in the Court order in Mabo2. I 
think the answer is clearly no, for several reasons. First, as held in 
Mabo, the communal title of Indigenous peoples is proprietary, and 
as a general rule legislative abrogation of property rights has to be 
clear and plain to be effective.21 The same rule applies to Indigenous 
land rights.-2 Principles of statutory interpretation also discourage 
giving substantive effect to a definition section (which s 223 clearly 
is), and favour constructions of legislation that maintain the 
jurisdiction of the courts.24 Moreover, s 51(xxxi) of the Australian 
Constitution provides that the Commonwealth Parliament can make 
laws for the acquisition of property on just terms', thereby imposing 
a constitutional requirement of compensation. If the NTA did away 
with Indigenous communal title based on exclusive occupation as 
declared in the Court order in Mabo, just compensation would have to 
be paid to any Indigenous communities that lost their communal title 
as a result. Finally, in Wik Peoples v Commonwealth^25 Justice Drummond 
held that a claim to Aboriginal and possessory title' filed before the 
enactment of the NTA could go ahead without being converted into 
230 
18. Mabo Misinterpreted 
a native title claim under the NTA, especially if aspects of the claim 
were outside the Act's scope, and the case proceeded all the way to the 
High Court on that basis.26 In other words, enactment of the statute 
and inclusion of a definition of native title therein did not do away 
with possessory land rights outside the NTA. Although claims brought 
under the NTA are limited to native title claims that come within the 
definition in s 223(1), claims brought outside the Act are not. 
As mentioned above, native title claims brought under the NTA 
have been limited by the High Court's interpretation of s 223(1) 
to rights and interests that can be proven to have existed under 
traditional laws and customs at the time of Crown acquisition of 
sovereignty. In addition, the Court held in Yorta Yorta that Indigenous 
communities lost the authority to make new laws and customs at that 
time, effectively denying them any right of internal self-government. 
Referring to native title rights and interests in that case, Chief Justice 
Gleeson and Justices Gummow and Hayne stated: 
It is important to recognise that the rights and interests 
concerned originate in a normative system, and to recognise 
some consequences that follow from the Crown s assertion 
of sovereignty. Upon the Crown acquiring sovereignty, the 
normative or law-making system which then existed could not 
thereafter validly create new rights, duties or interests. Rights 
or interests in land created after sovereignty and which owed 
their origin and continued existence only to a normative system 
other than that of the new sovereign power, would not and will 
not be given effect by the legal order of the new sovereign. 
While this denial of authority to make new laws and customs seems to 
stem principally from the outdated English doctrine that all political 
authority comes from the Crown, in my opinion the denial also relates 
to reliance on traditional laws and customs to define native title. Given 
that the content of that title depends on the laws and customs in 
existence at the time of Crown acquisition of sovereignty, changes to 
those laws and customs could change the content of the title, not just 
within the Indigenous community, but vis-a-vis the rest of Australian 
society. For example, if their traditional laws and customs at the time 
of Crown sovereignty did not give them a right to the minerals on 
their native title lands, changes to those laws and customs that would 
give them that right could have an impact on the rights of the Crown 
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and other Australians. The High Court does not seem to be willing to 
envisage this kind of possibility. 
If, however, Indigenous peoples have the kind of proprietary 
communal title that Brennan J described and the High Court declared 
in relation to the Murray Islands, this problem does not arise. In that 
situation, the community's rights vis-a-vis the rest of the world, as 
declared in the Court order in Mabo, are all-inclusive because they 
arise from exclusive occupation. Traditional laws and customs do not 
define the content of that title externally, instead, they apply internally to 
govern the rights of the members among themselves.28 Consequently, 
changes to those laws and customs would not have an impact on the 
rights of other Australians. Brennan J envisaged just this kind of 
scenario in Mabo: 
Of course in time the laws and customs of any people will 
change and the rights and interests of the members of the 
people among themselves will change too. But so long as the 
people remain as an identifiable community, the members 
of whom are identified by one another as members of that 
community living under its laws and customs, the communal 
native title survives to be enjoyed by the members according to 
the rights and interests to which they are respectively entitled 
under the traditionally based laws and customs, as currently 
acknowledged and observed.29 
In Yorta Yorta, the High Court did acknowledge that some modifications 
to traditional laws and customs are permissible. However, Gleeson 
CJ and Gummow and Hayne JJ clearly limited the authority of 
Indigenous communities in this regard: 
[Wjhat the assertion of sovereignty by the British Crown 
necessarily entailed was that there could thereafter be no 
parallel law-making system in the territory over which it 
asserted sovereignty. To hold otherwise would be to deny the 
acquisition of sovereignty and as has been pointed out earlier, 
that is not permissible. Because there could be no parallel law­
making system after the assertion of sovereignty it also follows 
that the only rights or interests in relation to land or waters, 
originating otherwise than in the new sovereign order, which 
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will be recognised after the assertion of that new sovereignty are 
those that find their origin in pre-sovereignty law and custom.30 
But to maintain that Indigenous communities retained law-making 
authority within their communities (as Brennan J appears to have 
envisaged in the passage quoted above) is not to deny the sovereignty 
of the Crown. In the Canadian case of Campbell v British Columbia, " 
for example, Justice Williamson held that the Nisga'a Nation retained 
a right of self-government over their Aboriginal title land that is 
not inconsistent with the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty.3'2 The 
monolithic conception of sovereignty clung to by the High Court in 
Yorta Yorta also fails to acknowledge the reality that communal rights 
necessarily entail community decision-making authority, the exercise 
of which depends on Indigenous governance systems.33 
In summary, I think the Commonwealth Parliament seriously 
misinterpreted Justice Brennan's judgment in Mabo when it enacted 
the NTA. The negative consequences for Indigenous peoples in 
Australia are apparent in the limited content of native title, loss of 
title when traditional laws and customs are not maintained, and 
judicial denial of a right of self-government. Of course one solution 
to this problem would be to amend the NTA so that the definition of 
native title contained therein correctly reflects Brennan J's judgment. 
Another possible solution would be for Indigenous communities to 
commence legal actions outside the NTA and seek declarations of the 
kind of title found in the Court order in Mabo. The goal would be to 
restore the formulation of Indigenous land rights contained in Mabo 
and distorted by the definition of native title in the NTA. Twenty 
years after the Mabo decision, this correction is long overdue. 
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